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1  Introduction
In terms of the arrangement constitutive of a trust in the narrow sense 
as defined in section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act,1 the ownership in 
property is made over or bequeathed to either the trustee (the ownership trust) 
or the trust beneficiaries with the trustee assuming control over the property 
(the bewind trust). Under both the ownership trust and the bewind trust, the 
trustee, in terms of the aforementioned definition, is the pivotal functionary 
who is responsible for the administration or disposal of property according to 
the provisions of the trust instrument. Such administration or disposal does 
not occur for the trustee’s own benefit, but for the benefit of the person or 
class of persons designated in the trust instrument, or for the achievement 
of the object stated in the trust instrument. The definition of “trust” in sec-
tion 1 of the Act gives legislative expression to what Cameron JA in Land 
and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker called the “core idea” 
of the trust, namely the functional separation of the trustee’s ownership (or 
control) over trust property from the enjoyment derived from such ownership 
(or control) through the bestowal of trust benefits on the trust’s beneficiaries 
or through the achievement of the trust’s object.
It is trite law that a functionary who administers or disposes of trust prop-
erty as contemplated in the Trust Property Control Act does so by virtue of 
holding the office of trustee – trusteeship, therefore, is an official position.3 In 
Joubert v Van Rensburg,4 Fleming DJP opined that a trustee is not an office-
holder and that a trustee, consequently, does not hold trust property in an 
official capacity. This assertion, which is inconsistent with the unambiguous 
legislative formulation in the Trust Property Control Act5 as well as emphatic 
judicial pronouncement6 to the contrary, was rightly criticised by academic 
1 57 of 1988.
 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA) 267a-b g.
3 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 852J; Hofer v Kevitt 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA) 386D; Land and 
Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA) 268a.
4 2001 1 SA 753 (W) 768I.
5 Ss 6(1), 10 and 11(1)(a) of the Act all bear reference to the “capacity” of trustee.
6 Mariola v Kaye-Eddie 1995 2 SA 728 (W) 729D-E; Simplex (Pty) Ltd v Van der Merwe 1996 1 SA 111 (W) 
112C-D; Van der Westhuizen v Van Sandwyk 1996 2 SA 490 (W) 492G; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 1 
SA 836 (W) 884E.
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commentators.7 In Mkangeli v Joubert8 the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that Fleming DJP’s opinion, along with his views on registration practice in 
respect of immovable trust property, was “unnecessary, the conclusion clearly 
obiter and prima facie wrong”. It is therefore beyond cavil that a trustee is an 
office-holder and acts as such in the capacity of trustee.
This contribution focuses on two matters pertinent to the office of trustee. 
First, the fiduciary nature of the office of trustee is investigated, with particular 
reference to the essence of a trustee’s fiduciary duty. Secondly, the protection 
afforded by a trustee’s fiduciary office to trust beneficiaries, particularly con-
tingent beneficiaries, is examined. It is shown that the protection enjoyed by 
contingent trust beneficiaries is frequently ascribed to their “vested interests 
in the proper administration of a trust” (which, it is submitted, means that each 
contingent trust beneficiary enjoys a personal right against the trust’s trustee 
for proper trust administration as counterpart to such trustee’s fiduciary duty). 
The question is then posed whether, as some commentators contend, such an 
interest in or right to proper trust administration allows extending a direct 
action, through the actio legis Aquiliae, to contingent trust beneficiaries for 
claiming delictual damages from an errant trustee in breach of trust.
2  Establishing a trustee in office
In Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd,9 it was held that the office of trus-
tee is created by the relevant trust instrument,10 and that the office is then 
filled in terms of such instrument by the Master of the High Court11 or by the 
High Court itself.1 Establishing a trustee in office is essentially a three-step 
process:
the office is created in terms of the trust instrument at hand;
the trustee is appointed as such under the trust instrument, by the Master 
or by the Court; and
the trustee accepts the appointment.13
7 Mostert & Du Toit “Joubert v Van Rensburg and the Registration of Immovable Trust Property in the 
Name of the ‘Trustees from Time to Time’: Rocking the Boat or a Storm in a Teacup?” 2002 Stell LR 
151 157-158; Van der Spuy & Van der Linde “Registrasie van Onroerende Trustgoed in die Naam van 
‘Trustees van Tyd tot Tyd’” 2002 THRHR 485 488-489.
8 2002 4 SA 36 (SCA) 43B-C.
9 1998 2 SA 554 (T) 557H.
10 S 1 of the Trust Property Control Act defines “trust instrument” as “a written agreement or a testamen-
tary writing or a court order according to which a trust was created”.
11 The Master’s power in this regard is conferred by s 7 of the Trust Property Control Act. See s 3 of the Act 
on the jurisdiction of Masters.
1 The High Court enjoys an inherent jurisdiction at common law to appoint trustees: Ex parte Milton 1959 
3 SA 426 (C) 428F; Ex parte Davenport 1963 1 SA 728 (SR) 731D 734E; Administrators, Estate Richards 
v Nichol 1996 4 SA 253 (C) 259H-I.
13 Cameron, De Waal, Wunsh, Solomon & Kahn Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts (2002) 216; Du 
Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice (2002) 61; Corbett, Hofmeyr & Kahn The Law of 
Succession in South Africa (2001) 400. See also Smit v Van de Werke 1984 1 SA 164 (T) 167H; Land and 
Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA) 267d. In the case of testamentary 
trusts, a trustee who has not declined the appointment is readily deemed to have accepted, whereas the 
trustee of an inter vivos trust will normally indicate acceptance by signing the trust deed: see Du Toit South 
African Trust Law 61. A trustee must furnish the Master with a completed acceptance-of-trusteeship form 
which is available at www.doj.gov.za/master/m_forms/acceptance_%20trusteeship.pdf (accessed on 
12 September 2007).
•
•
•
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However, despite having assumed such an office, a trustee is precluded 
from acting in this capacity before the Master has issued a letter of authority.14 
This, in turn, depends on the trustee having furnished security for the due and 
faithful performance of his duties as trustee15 or, alternatively, having been 
exempted from furnishing security.16
In Tijmstra v Blunt-MacKenzie,17 the applicant asked, inter alia, to have 
certain co-trustees of the Mary Tijmstra Trust removed from “their respective 
offices as trustees”. This application was opposed with a counter-application 
to similar effect (but in respect of other co-trustees) by some of the respond-
ents in the matter. The formulation of the relief sought in casu is questionable 
in light of the court’s view in Desai-Chilwan v Ross18 that, should a trust 
have more than one trustee, all co-trustees hold one office, irrespective of 
their number. It is, therefore, submitted that the relief sought in the Tijmstra 
case should rather have been for the removal of the relevant co-trustees from 
“their office as trustees”, because the co-trustees held a single office and not 
multiple offices in accordance with their number.
3  The fiduciary nature of the office of trustee
One of the principal characteristics of the office of trustee is that it is fiduci-
ary in nature.19 Stated differently, a trustee occupies a fiduciary position20 or 
holds trust property in a fiduciary capacity.1 Whatever description is used, 
the essential notion is that a trustee is subject to a fiduciary duty. In Hofer 
v Kevitt,3 the court opined that a trustee’s fiduciary duty originates from the 
trust instrument at hand (in casu the contract constitutive of an inter vivos 
trust). This view was rightly criticised by De Waal,4 who argues that a trustee’s 
fiduciary duty arises from the office of trustee and not from the instrument for 
placing a trustee in such office. De Waal’s criticism was echoed by Slomowitz 
AJ in Doyle v Board of Executors5 when a trustee’s duty of “utmost good 
faith” towards all trust beneficiaries was pertinently founded on such trustee’s 
occupation of a fiduciary office.
14 S 6(1) of the Trust Property Control Act.
15 S 6(2)(a) of the Trust Property Control Act.
16 S 6(2)(b) of the Trust Property Control Act.
17 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 461C-E.
18 2003 2 SA 644 (C) 650J.
19 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813A-B.
20 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 533; Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 812J; De Waal 
“The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the English, Scottish and South African Trusts Compared” 
2000 SALJ 548 557.
1 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 808D; Van der Spuy & Van der Linde 2002 THRHR 485 
490. A further important characteristic of the office of trustee (a discussion of which falls outside the 
scope of this contribution) is that it is “quasi-public” in nature, which renders a trustee, as office-holder, 
subject to judicial scrutiny and to the supervision of the Master of the High Court. See Cameron et al 
South African Law of Trusts 57; De Waal 2000 SALJ 548 566.
 The terms “fiduciary obligation” and “fiduciary responsibility” are also used in this regard. See Daewoo 
Heavy Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Banks 2004 2 All SA 530 (C) 533b-c; De Waal 2000 SALJ 548 558.
3 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 408B-C.
4 “Die Wysiging van ‘n Inter Vivos Trust” 1998 TSAR 326 331.
5 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813A-B.
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3 1 A trustee’s fiduciary duty
The concept of a fiduciary duty has proven to be something of a conundrum 
for South African courts and academic commentators alike. In Hofer v Kevitt26 
Conradie J described it as a concept with “no clearly defined meaning”. This 
assertion is to some extent borne out by South African courts’ use of the term. 
First, courts intermittently refer to, on the one hand, a trustee’s “fiduciary 
duty” (in the singular),7 whereas, on the other hand, judicial reference is made 
to a trustee’s “fiduciary duties” (in the plural).8 Secondly, while it is generally 
acknowledged that the fiduciary nature of the office of trustee occasions a 
trustee to be party to a fiduciary relationship, divergent views exist as to the 
trustee’s counterpart in such relationship: trust beneficiaries have been identi-
fied in this regard,9 whereas trust property has also been proffered.30
Notwithstanding the aforementioned discord, Heher JA, in dealing with 
the liability of an employee to his employer for secret profits made by the 
former out of an opportunity which arose in the course of his employment, 
opined in Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd31 that “[t]here is no magic in 
the term ‘fiduciary duty’”. It was held that the existence of such a duty as well 
as its nature and extent are factual matters to be adduced from a thorough 
consideration of the substance of the relationship between the relevant parties 
and any relevant circumstances which affect the operation of the relationship 
– the essential requirement for the establishment of a fiduciary duty is that one 
party must stand towards another in a position of confidence and good faith 
which he is obliged to protect.3 Heher JA referred to Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd,33 where the essence of a fiduciary duty was held 
to be that the party entrusted with the protection of the interests of another is 
not allowed to make a secret profit at the other’s expense or place himself in a 
position where his interests conflict with his duty to the other.34 In English law 
this obligation that arises from a fiduciary relationship is generally referred to 
as a duty of loyalty.35 In the Phillips case,36 Streicher JA, in a concurring judg-
ment, suggested that the duty of loyalty, insofar as it obliges an employee
“not to work against the [employer’s] interests; not to place himself in a position where his interests 
conflicted with those of the [employer]; and not to acquire…an interest or benefit without the consent 
of the [employer]”
26 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407B. See also Du Toit “Beyond Braun: An Examination of Some Interesting Issues 
from Recent Decisions on Trusts” 2001 TSAR 13 17.
7 Hofer v Kevitt 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407A. See also De Waal 1998 TSAR 326 331; Olivier “Trusts: Traps and 
Pitfalls” 2001 SALJ 4 9.
8 Hofer v Kevitt 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407F; Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813C-D; Bafokeng 
Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd 1999 3 SA 517 (BHC) 546B. See also Cameron “Constructive Trusts in South 
Africa: The Legacy Refused” 1999 Edinburgh LR 341 353.
9 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813B; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) 
284C-D; De Waal 1998 TSAR 326 330, 2000 SALJ 548 557.
30 Louw v Coetzee 2003 3 SA 329 (SCA) 336A-B; African Bank Ltd v Weiner 2003 4 All SA 50 (C) 54d-e. 
See also Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA) 267d.
31 2004 1 All SA 150 (SCA) 159e.
3 159e-g.
33 1921 AD 168 177.
34 160e-i. See also De Waal 2000 SALJ 548 558.
35 Hood “What Is So Special about Being a Fiduciary?” 2000 Edinburgh LR 308 310-311.
36 2004 1 All SA 150 (SCA) 166d.
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is the equivalent of a fiduciary duty.37
The Phillips case’s equation of a fiduciary with the duty of loyalty may well 
be ascribable to the nature of the matter before it. However, from a trust law 
perspective, an analysis of case law reveals that South African courts have 
extended a trustee’s fiduciary duty beyond the ambit of English law’s duty of 
loyalty strictu sensu.38 I therefore submit, first, that a South African trustee 
is under a single fiduciary duty, which can conveniently be called a “general 
fiduciary duty”.39 Secondly, this general fiduciary duty is multi-faceted in that 
it is comprised of a number of specific component duties. Which component 
duty or duties of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty will be relevant in any 
given instance will depend, as indicated by the court in the Phillips case, 
on the facts at hand adduced from the substance of the relationship between 
the relevant parties, as well as any relevant circumstances which affect the 
operation of such relationship. Two considerations in particular are decisive 
to establishing the existence, nature and extent of a trustee’s fiduciary duty. 
First, the principal focus of a trustee’s fiduciary duty is the manner in which 
he conducts the administration of trust property.40 Secondly, trust administra-
tion occurs to the advantage of trust beneficiaries and they are, consequently, 
beneficially interested in such administration.41 This being the case, it is set-
tled law that a trustee must, as a bonus et diligens paterfamilias,4 conduct 
trust administration with the utmost good faith43 and in the best interests of 
the trust beneficiaries.44
The common-law standard of care in respect of trustees’ trust administra-
tion is now reflected in the duty of care imposed on trustees by section 9(1) of 
the Trust Property Control Act:
“A trustee shall, in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his powers, act with the care, dili-
gence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of another.”
The duty of care is arguably the Trust Property Control Act’s most fun-
damental prescript as to what is expected of a trustee in respect of trust 
administration. This fact is acknowledged by the frequently encountered view 
that a trustee’s general fiduciary duty arises from or, indeed, is equivalent 
to the duty of care: in Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd,45 argument was 
37 167f.
38 See also Olivier Trust Law and Practice (1990) 72.
39 The singular “fiduciary duty” rather than the plural “fiduciary duties” is, therefore, apposite.
40 Hofer v Kevitt 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407F; Olivier 2001 SALJ 4 9. See also Lorentz v TEK Corporation 
Provident Fund 1998 1 SA 192 (W) 221A-B; Welch’s Estate v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service 2005 4 SA 173 (SCA) 195J-196A.
41 Olivier 2001 SALJ 224 229; Ware & Roper “The World of Offshore Sham Trusts” 1999 Insurance and Tax 
17 18. See also Jowell v Bamwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 891B 894E; Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum 
Ltd 1999 3 SA 517 (BHC) 545J-546A; Nel v Metequity Ltd 2007 3 SA 34 (SCA) 38G.
4 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 534; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 894D; Tijmstra 
v Blunt-MacKenzie 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 474E 476I.
43 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813B. See also Daewoo Heavy Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Banks 2004 2 All SA 530 (C) 533c.
44 Olivier 2001 SALJ 4 9. See also Jowell v Bamwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 891B 894E; Bafokeng 
Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd 1999 3 SA 517 (BHC) 545J-546A; Nel v Metequity Ltd 2007 3 SA 34 (SCA) 
38G.
45 1998 2 SA 554 (T) 556I-J.
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advanced on the basis of “the fiduciary duties imposed on a trustee by s 9 of 
the Act”; Kloppers46 states that section 9(1) of the Act “confirms a trustee’s 
fiduciary obligations to the trust beneficiaries”;47 De Waal48 argues that section 
9(1) encapsulates the “essence of a trustee’s fiduciary duty to the beneficiar-
ies”;49 and Olivier50 pertinently refers to section 9(1) of the Act when she states 
that trustees “have a fiduciary duty to administer at all times the trust assets 
for the benefit of the beneficiaries”.
Although there may well be merit in an approach linking the duty of care 
directly (and even exclusively) to a trustee’s general fiduciary duty, I submit 
that the duty of care strictu sensu is but one, albeit perhaps the most signifi-
cant, component duty of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty. This submission is 
founded on two considerations. First, Cameron JA’s exposition in Land and 
Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker51 on the essentials of trustee-
ship, emanating from the “core idea” of the trust, includes, but is not confined 
to, a trustee’s duty of care. Cameron JA acknowledged that the “standard of 
care exacted of [trustees]” derives from the functional separation between a 
trustee’s ownership (or control) over trust property and any benefit consequent 
thereupon, which separation, moreover, “serves to secure diligence on the 
part of the trustee”.5 However, Cameron JA also mentioned further essentials 
of trusteeship (to be discussed hereunder) stemming from the “core idea” of 
the trust, and I submit that these other essentials represent further components 
of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty. Secondly, an analysis of case law reveals 
that South African courts have indeed attributed an essential fiduciary quality 
to a number of other specific trustee duties and I propose that these duties 
constitute further component duties of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty.
One such further duty is a trustee’s duty to act with the requisite impartial-
ity, which not only implies the avoidance of a conflict of interest between a 
trustee’s personal interests and those of the beneficiaries,53 but also prohibits 
a trustee from making any undue profit from his trusteeship54 – essentially 
the duty of loyalty referred to earlier. In Jowell v Bramwell-Jones,55 a trustee 
entered into a scheme that was alleged to have created a conflict between her 
interest as co-trustee and her interest as co-beneficiary of the trust. Scott JA 
held the following, thereby establishing an association between a trustee’s 
duty of impartiality and fiduciary duty:
46 “Enkele Lesse vir Trustees uit die Parker-beslissing” 2006 TSAR 414 41.
47 Translated from the original Afrikaans.
48 1998 TSAR 326 330.
49 Translated from the original Afrikaans.
50 Olivier “The Treatment of Trusts for Income and Capital Gains Tax Purposes: The Screws Tighten” 2002 
TSAR 220 221. See also Olivier 2001 SALJ 4 9.
51 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA).
5 267g.
53 Hoppen v Shub 1987 3 SA 201 (C) 210A-B; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) 284G-285A; 
Tijmstra v Blunt-MacKenzie 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 476I. See also African Bank Ltd v Weiner 2003 4 All 
SA 50 (C) 54b-c; Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 1 All SA 150 (SCA) 166d; Daewoo Heavy 
Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Banks 2004 2 All SA 530 (C) 533c-d.
54 See generally African Bank Ltd v Weiner 2003 4 All SA 50 (C) 54d-e; Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) 
Ltd 2004 1 All SA 150 (SCA) 166d; Daewoo Heavy Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Banks 2004 2 All SA 530 
(C) 533c-d; De Waal 2000 SALJ 548 558.
55 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA).
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“A trustee must, generally speaking, avoid as far as possible a conflict of interest between her personal 
interests and those of the beneficiaries…I am satisfied that the allegations contained in the particulars 
of claim are capable of supporting evidence which would establish a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary 
duty.”56
The inclusion of a trustee’s duty of impartiality, prohibiting any conver-
gence of the trustee’s interests with those of the beneficiaries as a component 
duty of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty, is fortified by Cameron JA’s view 
in Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker57 that “an iden-
tity of interests [between trustee and beneficiaries]…is inimical to the trust 
idea…”58
A third component duty of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty is that he is 
duty bound to exhibit a minimum degree of independence in respect of trust 
administration – a trustee, as a fiduciary office-holder, should exercise inde-
pendent judgment in respect of trust administration and should not merely 
slavishly follow the lead of the trust founder, his co-trustees or the trust ben-
eficiaries.59 Cameron JA acknowledged a trustee’s independence in Land and 
Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker60 as an essential of trusteeship, 
stemming from the “core idea” of the trust, when he stated that the functional 
separation of a trustee’s ownership (or control) over trust property from any 
benefit consequent thereupon “tends to ensure independence of judgment on 
the part of the trustee – an indispensable requisite of office”.61
A fourth and final duty that South African courts have endowed with a 
fiduciary quality is a trustee’s duty of accountability in respect of trust admin-
istration, inter alia, by maintaining proper accounts of transactions concluded 
in the course of trust administration and by rendering a proper account of 
trust administration when requested to do so. A trustee’s accountability 
is, of course, facilitated through the trustee’s compliance with his duty to 
separate trust property from his personal property62 and therefore, the last-
mentioned duty is, for purposes of enumerating the component duties of a 
trustee’s general fiduciary duty, included under a trustee’s duty to account 
for trust administration.63 In Doyle v Board of Executors,64 Slomowitz AJ, in 
an analogy with the “duties of good faith, which are owed by an agent to his 
56 84G-85A.
57 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA).
58 267b.
59 Tijmstra v Blunt-MacKenzie 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 474E-F; Olivier 2001 SALJ 224 229-230; Ware & Roper 
1999 Insurance and Tax 17 18. See also Hoppen v Shub 1987 3 SA 201 (C) 217C 217G; African Bank Ltd 
v Weiner 2003 4 All SA 50 (C) 54b-e.
60 [2004] 4 All SA 261 (SCA).
61 268a.
62 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813G.
63 S 10 of the Trust Property Control Act directs the opening of a separate trust account by a trustee and 
s 11 of the Act regulates the registration and identification of trust property by a trustee. Du Toit South 
African Trust Law 73 points out, in the context of a trustee’s accountability, that compliance with the 
aforementioned provisions enables a trustee to provide a permanent constructive record of his conduct of 
trust affairs when he is called upon to give an accounting.
64 1999 2 SA 805 (C).
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principal”,65 associated the duty to account with a trustee’s fiduciary duty as 
follows:66
“The duty which falls upon those who occupy a fiduciary position to keep proper accounts is often 
said to be sui generis…The duties of good faith, which are owed by an agent to his principal, are no 
different in kind to those which fall on a trustee…Inextricably bound up with the…compendium of 
obligations [of an agent to his principal] is the agent’s duty to give an accounting to his principal of all 
that he knows and has done in the execution of his mandate and with the principal’s property.”
In Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker,67 Cameron 
JA, although not dealing with a trustee’s accountability in respect of trust 
administration in so many words, did allude to a trustee’s duty to render an 
account of trust administration when he found that adherence to the “core 
idea” of the trust “tends to ensure…careful scrutiny of transactions designed 
to bind the trust...”68
I submit that the aforementioned four duties, namely the duty of care, the 
duty of impartiality, the duty of independence and the duty of accountability, 
are the principal component parts of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty under 
South African law. These four duties do not constitute a numerus clausus and 
the submission that they constitute the essential components of a trustee’s 
general fiduciary duty does not preclude future additions to the list of compo-
nent duties of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty – the four duties highlighted 
above are, however, the ones to date identified by the courts as fundamentally 
possessive of fiduciary quality. Indeed, the ambit of a fiduciary duty is not 
static, and is subject to change depending upon the facts and circumstances at 
hand.69 In light of the fluid nature of a fiduciary duty, it stands to reason that it 
is incumbent upon every trustee to ascertain what the rights and obligations 
of the office entail, also the fiduciary component thereof, and to execute the 
trust in accordance with these rights and obligations.70 As indicated in Phillips 
v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd, the facts and circumstances of a particular case 
will determine whether one, more or all of the component duties of a trustee’s 
general fiduciary duty will inform a court’s decision when such fiduciary duty 
is at issue.
4  A trustee’s fiduciary office and beneficiary protection
4 1  Vested rights and contingent rights under a trust: the legal 
position of the contingent trust beneficiary
A trust beneficiary who, in terms of the trust instrument at hand, enjoys 
an immediate entitlement to trust benefits (whether income and/or capital), 
is vested with a personal right to claim payment of such benefits from the 
65 813D-E.
66 812J 813D 813G-H. See also Tijmstra v Blunt-MacKenzie 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 471H-I 474C-E; Daewoo 
Heavy Industries (SA) Ltd v Banks 2004 2 All SA 530 (C) 533d-e.
67 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA).
68 268a-b.
69 Howard v Herrigel 1991 2 SA 660 (A) 678B-C; Ghersi v Tiber Developments (Pty) Ltd 2007 4 SA 536 
(SCA) 544H-545B.
70 Tijmstra v Blunt-MacKenzie 2002 1 SA 459 (T) 468J.
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trust’s trustee when it becomes distributable.71 If, on the other hand, a trust 
instrument provides that a trust beneficiary’s acquisition of a personal right 
to claim payment of trust benefits is not immediate, but rather contingent 
or conditional upon the occurrence of an uncertain future event, a personal 
right to claim trust benefits will only vest in such beneficiary if and when the 
contingency has taken place or the condition has been fulfilled.7 Before the 
occurrence of the contingency or fulfillment of the condition, the beneficiary 
is said to enjoy a so-called “contingent right” to trust benefits and such a ben-
eficiary is often called a “contingent beneficiary” or “potential beneficiary”.73 
Whether a contingent beneficiary is endowed with a mere spes to receive trust 
benefits or, alternatively, with something more substantive, is not altogether 
clear. Authority exists for the view that, prior to the vesting of a personal right 
to claim trust benefits, such a beneficiary enjoys no substantive entitlement 
to such benefits. I therefore submit that a contingent beneficiary is indeed 
nothing more than a spes-holder in respect of trust benefits.74
4 2  A trustee’s fiduciary office and a contingent trust beneficiary’s 
right to proper trust administration
Because a trustee holds a fiduciary office which places him in a fiduciary 
relationship with the trust’s beneficiaries and imposes upon him a general 
fiduciary duty to conduct the management of trust affairs in the utmost good 
faith (that is, with the requisite care, impartiality, independence and account-
ability), every trust beneficiary, regardless of any personal right he may or 
may not have to trust income and/or capital, enjoys a personal right against 
the trustee for the proper administration of the trust in accordance with the 
aforementioned demands of his fiduciary office. This submission is supported, 
first, by Slomowitz AJ’s finding in Doyle v Board of Executors75 that it is 
“unquestionable that a trustee occupies a fiduciary office … [b]y virtue of 
[which] alone he owes the utmost good faith towards all beneficiaries, whether 
71 Cameron et al South African Law of Trusts 558; Corbett et al Law of Succession 413-417.
7 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 872G-H; Webb v Davis 1998 2 SA 975 (SCA) 981I-J. See also 
Hilda Holt Will Trust v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1992 4 SA 661 (A) 665J-666A.
73 The terms “contingent beneficiary” and “potential beneficiary” are often used synonymously: eg, Lacob 
“Doyle v Board of Executors: Confirming the Contingent Beneficiary’s Right to an Accounting” 2000 
SALJ 441 442 argues that either term can be used to describe a beneficiary who has no vested right to 
claim trust income and/or capital because such beneficiary’s entitlement is conditional on the occurrence 
or non-occurrence of a future uncertain event, which event can be the exercise of a power of appointment 
by a trustee of a discretionary trust. However, both Stander “Hoe Veilig Is die Bates in ‘n Trust in Geval 
van die Sekwestrasie van die Boedel van Een van die Partye?” 1999 TRW 145 149-150 and Du Toit South 
African Trust Law 110 rely on Stern & Ruskin NNO v Appleson 1951 3 SA 800 (W) for their proposition 
that a beneficiary under a discretionary trust is indeed not endowed with a contingent right prior to the 
trustee’s exercise of the discretion to appoint beneficiaries under the trust. According to their view a 
discretionary trust beneficiary can, therefore, not be called a “contingent beneficiary” but, in the words 
of Stander 1999 TRW 145 150, “[d]ie diskresionêre begunstigde het alleen maar ‘n reg om as potensiële 
begunstigde in ag geneem te word en ‘n hoop dat die trustee sy diskresie in sy guns sal uitoefen”. See 
further on the use of these terms Mariola v Kaye-Eddie 1995 2 SA 728 (W) 731I-J; Pentz v Gross 1996 2 
SA 518 (C) 520I-J; Hofer v Kevitt 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407I; Gross v Pentz 1996 4 SA 617 (A) 628I-J; Doyle 
v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813B.
74 Beira v Beira 1990 3 SA 802 (W) 807G-H 808E; Welch’s Estate v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service 2005 4 SA 173 (SCA) 187G. See also Cameron et al South African Law of Trusts 557.
75 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813A-B.
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actual or potential”76 and, secondly, by Corbett CJ’s view in Gross v Pentz77 
that even contingent trust beneficiaries “have vested interests in the proper 
administration of the trust”.78 It is, therefore, evident that a trust beneficiary’s 
interest in a trustee’s proper trust administration is separate and distinct from 
(although, admittedly, not irrelevant to) the interest that a beneficiary with a 
vested right to trust income and/or capital has in receiving such benefits. Even 
a contingent beneficiary without any substantive entitlement to trust benefits 
is beneficially interested in a trustee’s proper trust administration. Lacob79 
argues convincingly that a trustee’s fiduciary duty to properly administer a 
trust and a trust beneficiary’s concomitant interest in proper trust administra-
tion means that each and every beneficiary enjoys a personal right against a 
trustee which obliges the latter to administer the trust properly and to perform 
all duties imposed upon him by the trust instrument or by law. Moreover, in 
Doyle v Board of Executors,80 the court, through relying on an analogy with 
the “duties of good faith” owed by an agent to his principal, characterised 
a trustee’s duty to account as a “substantive legal duty”. This characterisa-
tion of one of the component duties of a trustee’s general fiduciary duty as 
substantive in nature implies, it is submitted, that a trust beneficiary, even a 
contingent beneficiary, according to Slomowitz AJ in the Doyle case,81 enjoys 
a substantive right to proper trust administration against a trust’s trustee, 
which right constitutes the reverse of such trustee’s fiduciary obligation. I 
therefore propose that, from the perspective of a trustee’s compliance with his 
fiduciary duty, a contingent beneficiary is not merely a spes-holder, but the 
holder of a substantive personal right to proper trust administration.8
4 3  The protection afforded by a trustee’s fiduciary office: remedies 
available to a contingent trust beneficiary
A trust beneficiary who holds a vested right to trust benefits can generally 
invoke the full complement of beneficiary remedies to protect his interests 
under a trust.83 A contingent trust beneficiary, on the other hand, is rather 
restricted in his choice of available remedies against both the trust’s trustee as 
well as third parties. The remedies that are available to a contingent trust ben-
eficiary are readily founded on such beneficiary’s personal right against the 
trust’s trustee for proper trust administration. Amongst these remedies count 
obtaining a prohibitory interdict to restrain a trustee who is about to alienate 
trust property contrary to the provisions of a trust instrument (for purposes of 
obtaining this remedy even a contingent beneficiary apparently enjoys locus 
76 My emphasis.
77 1996 4 SA 617 (A) 628I.
78 See also Pentz v Gross 1996 2 SA 518 (C) 523I.
79 2000 SALJ 441 443.
80 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813D-814G.
81 813A-B.
8 See also Lacob 2000 SALJ 441 44.
83 For discussions on such remedies see Cameron et al South African Law of Trusts 361-416; Du Toit South 
African Trust Law 124-128; Corbett et al Law of Succession 418-421; De Waal & Schoeman-Malan 
Introduction to the Law of Succession (2003) 169-170.
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standi);84 the institution of a representative action on behalf of a trust against a 
trustee or third party, inter alia to recover trust assets, to nullify transactions 
entered into by the trust or to recover damages from a third party (for pur-
poses of instituting this action even a contingent trust beneficiary apparently 
enjoys locus standi);85 and the invocation of some of the statutory remedies 
available to trust beneficiaries, principally under the Trust Property Control 
Act, for example by calling upon a trustee to account for trust administration 
even for a period during which the beneficiary requesting an accounting held 
only a contingent right under the trust.86
The principal civil remedy available to a beneficiary against an errant trustee 
who failed to administer a trust properly and, in so doing, committed breach 
of trust which resulted in patrimonial loss to the beneficiary concerned, is, 
of course, the actio legis Aquiliae for the recovery of delictual damages from 
such trustee in his personal capacity. To succeed with the Aquilian action, a 
plaintiff-beneficiary must satisfy all the requirements for the imposition of 
Aquilian liability. Importantly, the beneficiary must show that he sustained 
actual patrimonial loss in consequence of the trustee’s wrongful and culpa-
ble breach of trust. For this reason it was found in the two Gross decisions87 
that only a trust beneficiary who holds a vested right to trust benefits enjoys 
locus standi to institute the Aquilian action against a trustee – a contingent 
beneficiary will be unable to show that he sustained loss in consequence of 
an emasculation88 of a right to receive trust income and/or capital. However, 
Olivier89 proposes that the Aquilian action should indeed be available to a ben-
eficiary who holds no vested right to trust benefits, but holds only a personal 
right against the trustee for proper trust administration. Olivier argues that 
such beneficiary’s locus standi to institute the actio legis Aquiliae is based on 
his “vested interest against the trustee for the trust to be properly adminis-
tered”. Olivier then makes the following proposal:
“If the trust fund suffers a loss, it affects the beneficiary’s interests. The prejudice caused to the 
beneficiary’s interests by the trustee’s actions could be in the nature of a patrimonial loss because of a 
diminution in the income or capital, which will ultimately be transmitted to the beneficiary.” 90
It appears that Olivier advances the above proposition so as to found a con-
tingent beneficiary’s legal standing during the period of the contingency of 
his right to trust benefits. Any ultimate transmission of income or capital to 
a beneficiary will, of course, be occasioned by the vesting of a right to such 
benefit in the beneficiary concerned which, if diminished by reason of the 
trustee’s improper trust administration, will constitute actual patrimonial loss 
84 Pentz v Gross 1996 2 SA 518 (C) 523J-524A; Cameron et al South African Law of Trusts 389; Corbett et 
al Law of Succession 420; De Waal & Schoeman-Malan Introduction 169.
85 Pentz v Gross 1996 2 SA 518 (C); Gross v Pentz 1996 4 SA 617 (A). See also Bafokeng Tribe v Impala 
Platinum Ltd 1999 3 SA 517 (BHC).
86 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C); Lacob 2000 SALJ 441.
87 Pentz v Gross 1996 2 SA 518 (C) 523A; Gross v Pentz 1996 4 SA 617 (A) 626H-I. See also Cameron et 
al South African Law of Trusts 365; Corbett et al Law of Succession 420; De Waal & Schoeman-Malan 
Introduction 170.
88 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 877D.
89 Trust Law and Practice 101.
90 101.
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for the recovery of which the Aquilian action will lie. Olivier, however, pro-
poses that a contingent beneficiary has locus standi to institute the Aquilian 
action in order to recover damages for a loss that may be sustained in future 
when (and if) the beneficiary’s contingent right comes to fruition as a vested 
right to trust benefits – in other words, a claim, during the contingency of 
the beneficiary’s right to trust benefits, for damages in respect of prospective 
patrimonial loss.
Is Olivier’s proposition sound? It is arguable that on his view the Aquilian 
action is available to a contingent beneficiary if the beneficiary sustained 
future patrimonial loss in the form of the loss of a chance to gain a benefit, 
which is an acknowledged form of prospective patrimonial loss.91 Where, 
for example, a trust founder directed that the income from a trust must be 
accumulated for a period of ten years and then paid in full to beneficiary 
A, provided the trust generates net income of at least R500 000 over the 
accumulation period, A’s right to the trust income during the accumulation 
period is merely contingent, but, as argued above, A does hold a personal 
right against the trustee for proper trust administration. This right, according 
to Olivier’s argument, reflects A’s interest in the trust’s administration which, 
if properly conducted, may well secure the vesting of a right to trust income 
in A at the end of the accumulation period if the trust, by reason of its prudent 
administration, yields net income of at least R500 000. If the trustee fails to 
administer the trust properly, which, in turn, results in a failure to generate 
the minimum income amount for A’s contingent right to come to fruition, A 
would have lost the chance to gain a future benefit under the trust, particu-
larly if it is established that, but for the trustee’s mismanagement, the trust 
would indeed have generated the stipulated amount.9 Olivier’s proposition is 
ostensibly that a claim for delictual damages by A, as contingent beneficiary, 
should lie against the trustee in the aforementioned scenario. Of course, this 
contention runs contrary to the general rule that damages cannot be claimed 
solely for prospective loss, as a plaintiff’s cause of action is only established 
once damage has indeed been sustained.93 However, Boberg supports the view 
that, where prospective loss can only be established as a matter of reasonable 
probability, a claim for damages in respect of such loss should lie.94 Boberg’s 
contention was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Jowell 
v Bramwell-Jones,95 but the Court opined that “the inevitable uncertainty 
associated with such an approach is likely to prove impractical and result in 
hardship to the plaintiff particularly insofar as the running of prescription is 
concerned”. However, the court left the question of the appropriateness of an 
action only for prospective loss open.96
91 See on the loss of a chance to gain a benefit Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Delict (2006) 207.
9 Du Toit South African Trust Law 86.
93 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 891F-G; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) 
287C-D; Neethling et al Law of Delict 208.
94 The Law of Delict (1984) 488. See also Neethling et al Law of Delict 208 n 128.
95 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) 287F-H.
96 87H-I.
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Should a contingent beneficiary’s claim under the Aquilian action for pro-
spective patrimonial loss lie, it would, of course, in the terminology espoused 
in Gross v Pentz,97 constitute a direct action by the beneficiary against the 
trust’s trustee. However, Olivier concludes his argument with the suggestion 
that where a contingent beneficiary’s claim is successful, the court should 
order that damages be paid into the trust fund, and not to the beneficiary per-
sonally.98 This suggestion is rather evocative of a representative action where 
a beneficiary litigates, not in his own right, but rather on behalf of a trust – the 
proceeds of litigation to accrue to the trust, rather than to the beneficiary 
personally.99 It is, therefore, somewhat unclear whether Olivier’s suggestion as 
to a contingent beneficiary’s locus standi to sue in delict pertains to a direct or 
representative action. Nevertheless, although Olivier’s contention is contrary 
to principle insofar as it bears on a direct action, it is interesting, since it is 
pertinently founded on a contingent trust beneficiary’s interest in a trustee’s 
proper trust administration, which interest the trustee is obliged to protect in 
terms of his general fiduciary duty. However, the two Gross decisions remain 
authority for the proposition that only a beneficiary with a vested right to trust 
benefits can institute the actio legis Aquiliae directly to recover damages from 
a trustee for loss sustained in consequence of such trustee’s breach of trust.
5  Conclusion
De Waal100 states emphatically that the ratio for the office of trustee is the 
advantage and protection afforded thereby to trust beneficiaries. While benefi-
ciary protection undoubtedly lies at the heart of the fiduciary office of trustee, 
protection afforded to contingent trust beneficiaries is limited to remedies 
that can be brought within the ambit of such beneficiaries’ personal rights to 
proper trust administration. However, it is appears unlikely that our courts 
will, along the lines of arguments such as those advanced by Olivier and oth-
ers, extend contingent beneficiary protection also to include the institution of 
the actio legis Aquiliae as a direct action against a trustee in breach of trust. 
The reason is that such extension is incompatible with one of the fundamental 
principles of the South African law of delict in respect of the recovery of 
damages for future patrimonial loss. But the possibility of such an exten-
sion in future ought perhaps not to be rejected summarily – the demands of 
contingent trust beneficiary protection in a scenario akin to the one sketched 
in section 4 3 above can conceivably become such that a court may be moved 
to extend the Aquilian remedy beyond its traditional ambit. The suggestion 
97 1996 4 SA 617 (A) 625F.
98 Trust Law and Practice 102.
99 Gross v Pentz 1996 4 SA 617 (A) 625F.
100 “The Liability of Co-trustees for Breach of Trust” 1999 Stell LR 1 31.
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of such a radical protective step – and one that runs contrary to settled legal 
principles – is indeed not unknown to South African trust law.101
OPSOMMING
Hierdie bydare ondersoek die fidusiêre amp van trustee met spesifieke fokus op die aard en omvang 
van ’n trustee se algemene fidusiêre plig ten opsigte van trustadministrasie in belang van trustbegun-
stigdes. Daar word geargumenteer dat ’n trustee se algemene fidusiêre plig wesenlik ’n saamgestelde 
plig is wat uit ’n viertal spesifieke trustee-pligte bestaan. Daar word verder geargumenteer dat ’n 
trustee se fidusiêre plig ’n ooreenstemmende persoonlike reg tot behoorlike trustadministrasie aan 
trustbegunstigdes besorg, welke persoonlike reg ook begunstigdes toekom wat geen gevestigde regte 
nie, maar bloot voorwaardelike regte op trustvoordele geniet. Daar word voorts getoon dat die bes-
kerming wat sodanige voorwaardelike trustbegunstigdes langs die weg van erkende regsremedies 
geniet, hoofsaaklik geskoei word op hul gevestigde belang in behoorlike trustadministrasie soos deur 
voorgenoemde persoonlike reg vergestalt. Tog is die remedies van trustbegunstigdes met voorwaarde-
like regte op trustvoordele teen trustees en derde partye relatief beperk en die vraag word aangespreek 
of die vernaamste begunstigde-remedie teen ’n trustee wat trustbreuk gepleeg het, naamlik die actio 
legis Aquiliae vir die verhaal van vermoënskade, nie, soos sommige kommentatore voorstel, tot soda-
nige begunstigdes uitgebrei kan word nie.
101 Eg, in Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 2004 4 All SA 261 (SCA), the Supreme 
Court of Appeal proposed a number of solutions to problems stemming from the abuse of the trust by 
reason of an identity of interests between trustees and trust beneficiaries – at least one of these suggested 
solutions, namely the possible application of the Turquand rule to trusts, according to some commenta-
tors runs contrary to established legal principles. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in advancing 
the Turquand solution (albeit obiter), ostensibly attached greater value to the protection of third parties 
who engage with trusts than the criticism voiced by, inter alia, the court a quo in Parker v Land and 
Agricultural Bank of SA 2003 1 All SA 258 (T) 264c. According to this critcism, the earlier application 
of the Turquand rule to trusts in MAN Truck & Bus (SA) Ltd v Victor 2001 2 SA 562 (NC) and Vrystaat 
Mielies (Edms) Bpk v Nieuwoudt 2003 2 SA 262 (O) is incompatible with the fundamental principle that 
a trust, unlike a company, is generally not endowed with legal personality.
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